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United States Regulation of Canadian
Securities Attorneys under Sarbanes-Oxley:
Exploring Costs and Finding an Optimal
Allocation of Authority
Lauren M. Harper*
I. INTRODUCTION
In reaction to a series of corporate scandals, starting with the
collapse of the energy giant Enron,' the United States enacted the
landmark Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Pro-
tection Act of 2002 [hereinafter "the Act"].2 The Act, more com-
monly known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, creates a new disclosure
and corporate governance regime that imposes a framework of
oversight upon corporate officers, accountants, and attorneys.
In an unprecedented attempt to federalize the norms of secur-
ities attorneys,4 Section 307 of the Act requires the United States
* Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2005, University of Miami School of Law. The
author would like to thank Professor Robert E. Rosen for his insights regarding the
writing of this Comment and all the members of the Inter-American Law Review who
helped edit this Comment. The author would like to dedicate this Comment to her
father who had a brilliant mind for economics.
1. Enron Corporation was listed as the seventh largest company in the United
States at the time of its collapse. See Janis Sarra, Rose-Colored Glasses, Opaque
Financial Reporting, and Investor Blues: Enron as Con and the Vulnerability of
Canadian Corporate Law, 76 ST. Join's L. REV. 715, 715-16 (2002). Since its demise,
shareholders have lost more than $60 billion in market value, thousands of employees
have lost their jobs, and creditors have lost billions in trade and other credit. Id. The
failed governance of Enron was quickly followed by the collapse of WorldCom, Global
Crossing and many other large corporations. Id. See also Marianne M. Jennings, A
Primer on Enron: Lessons from a Perfect Storm of Financial Reporting Corporate
Governance and Ethical Culture Failures, 39 CAL. W. L. REV. 163, 164 n.1 (2003).
2. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at
15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266). As President George W. Bush signed this legislation into
law he exclaimed that the Act contained "the most far reaching reforms of American
business practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt." President George W.
Bush, Policy in Focus: Corporate Responsibility. Remarks at the Signing of the
Corporate Corruption Bill (July 30, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2002/07/print/20020730.html (July 30, 2002) (last visited Oct. 26,
2004).
3. See Larry Cata Backer, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Federalizing Norms for
Officer, Lawyer, and Accountant Behavior, 76 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 897 (2002).
4. Id. Many were stunned that the U.S. attempted to impose ethics rules upon a
profession that historically enjoyed virtually unfettered self-regulation. See Otis
Bilodeau, Vinson Partner Defends His Firm, His Integrity, THE RECORDER, Mar. 21,
2002, at 3 (stating that one commentator noted that no one could remember a hearing
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Securities and Exchange Commission [hereinafter "SEC" or "Com-
mission"] to develop rules establishing minimum standards of pro-
fessional conduct for attorneys appearing before the Commission.
This includes an affirmative obligation for lawyers to report evi-
dence of corporate misconduct "up-the-ladder" within the company
first to the chief executive officer ["CEO"] or chief legal officer
["CLO"], and then, if the CEO or CLO does not respond appropri-
ately, to the board of directors.' Promulgated by the SEC in
August of 2003, the final rule [hereinafter "Rule 205" or "the
Rule" 6 also permits lawyers to report misconduct to the SEC
when substantial financial harm is likely to result from an issuer's
violations.' A more controversial provision, however, was
included in the proposed Rule 205. That provision requires law-
yers to withdraw and report such withdrawal to the SEC when
substantial financial harm is likely to result from an issuer's vio-
lations.5 Although the "noisy withdrawal" is not embodied in the
final Rule, the SEC may choose to adopt it at a later date.'
According to the SEC's comments, Rule 205 is designed to
specifically focusing on the lawyer's role before the Congressional hearing
questioning a panel of Enron's in-house and outside counsel). The courts claim an
inherent right to regulate the legal profession, but have delegated much of this
authority to the state bar associations. See generally DEBORAH L. RHODE & GEOFFREY
C. HAZARD, JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 41 (2002). The
justification for the American lawyers' privileged self-regulation is phrased in the
Preamble to the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct: "An
independent legal profession is an important force in preserving government under
law, for abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose
members are not dependent on government for the right to practice." MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. As such, many U.S. attorneys oppose Section 307 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See David J. Beck, The Legal Profession at the Crossroads: Who
Will Write the Future Rules Governing the Conduct of Lawyers Representing
Corporations?, 34 ST. MARY's L.J. 873, 906-14 (2003).
5. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 2, §307.
6. 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1-205.7 (2003).
7. Id. at § 205.3(d)(2)(i).
8. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed.
Reg. 71,670 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(i)(A-C))
(noting this as the first proposed release setting forth the proposed steps of the "noisy
withdrawal"). See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2003) ("[W~e are extending the comment period on the
"noisy withdrawal" and related provisions of the proposed rules and are issuing a
separate release soliciting comment on this issue."), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/final/33-8185.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2004).
9. Id. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,
17 C.F.R. § 205 (2003) ("[Wle are extending the comment period on the "noisy
withdrawal" and related provisions of the proposed rules and are issuing a separate
release soliciting comment on this issue."), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/
33-8185.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2004).
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protect investors by helping to increase investor confidence, pre-
vent and deter corporate misconduct and fraud, improve corporate
governance by providing a process to identify and remedy material
violations of law, and give guidance and clarity to securities law-
yers regarding their ethical obligations. 10 The SEC contends that
such benefits outweigh the costs upon issuers and the law firms
that represent them - costs so minimal that they do not dissuade
businesses to offer or list securities in U.S. markets. 1
The SEC also recognized that non-U.S. lawyers play signifi-
cant roles in connection with Commission filings by both foreign
and United States issuers. 2 Consequently, the SEC imposed the
Rule, with certain exceptions, 3 upon foreign securities attorneys
practicing before the Commission. Despite the exceptions added
10. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 17
C.F.R. §§ 205.1-205.7 (2003) (discussed in Costs and Benefits section), available at
http://www.sec.gov.rules.final.33-8185 (last visited Sept. 26, 2004). Cf. United States
Securities and Exchange Commissioner, Paul S. Atkins, Address at the University of
Cologne, Germany (February 5, 2003) ("Fundamentally, the [Sarbanes-Oxley Act]
acknowledges the importance of stockholder value. Without equity investors and
their confidence, our economic growth and continued technological innovations would
be slowed."), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch020503psa.htm (last
visited Sept. 26, 2004).
11. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 17
C.F.R. §§ 205.1-205.7 (2003) (discussed in Costs and Benefits section), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2004). See also
Atkins, supra note 10 (exclaiming that a primary goal of SEC is to make it inviting for
global businesses to offer and list their securities in U.S. markets and that Sarbanes-
Oxley does not interfere with this goal).
12. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 17
C.F.R. §§ 205.1-205.7 (2003) (discussed in Section-by-Section Discussion for non-
appearing foreign attorney exception), available at http://www.sec.gov.rules.final.33-
8185 (last visited Sept. 26, 2004). Cf Atkins, supra note 10 (noting that over 1,300
non-U.S. corporations from 59 countries file reports with the SEC).
13. Although the Act generally does not make distinctions between U.S. and non-
U.S. issuers, the SEC has softened some of the Act's more controversial provisions by
providing limited exceptions for foreign issuers. See Atkins, supra note 10. See also
Kenji Taneda, Sarbanes-Oxley, Foreign Issuers and United States Securities
Regulation, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 715, 716-17 (2003). Rule 205 epitomizes such
accommodations. After the proposed rule was released, the Commission received over
forty comment letters from foreign parties and hosted a special Roundtable on the
International Impact of the Proposed Rules Regarding Attorney Conduct. See
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 205.1-205.7 (2003) (discussed in Section-by-Section Discussion for non-appearing
foreign attorney exception), available at http://www.sec.gov.rules.final.33-8185 (last
visited Sept. 26, 2004). To accommodate concerns that surfaced during this
contentious comment period, the Commission adjusted the final rule and provided
certain safe-harbors for foreign attorneys. Id. See also discussion infra Part III.A
(discussing non-appearing foreign attorney exception and conflict of law preemption).
14. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 17
C.F.R. §§ 205.1-205.7 (2003) (discussed in Section-by-Section Discussion for non-
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in the final Rule, many foreign attorneys are opposed to the Rule
because they believe that the United States should not be able to
exercise any jurisdiction over the legal profession outside of its
borders.15 As the Law Society of Upper Canada aptly elaborates in
its comment to the Commission regarding the proposed rule:
It seems inappropriate for the Commission to purport to
extend its authority into foreign jurisdictions in order to
regulate a purely domestic matter - the professional con-
duct of lawyers - simply because foreign lawyers may in
the course of their practices from time to time act on behalf
of clients that are subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission.16
Considering that Canada is the largest foreign issuer in the U.S.
exchanges, it is particularly important to understand the impact
of the Rule upon Canadian securities lawyers. 7 Such an analysis
can serve as an indicator as to whether any such extraterritorial
application of the Rule is appropriate or effective.
This comment analyzes the effects of imposing Rule 205 upon
Canadian securities attorneys and concludes that the benefits of
the Rule are outweighed by the costs. Although the Rule is
stricter than most Canadian regulations governing securities
attorney conduct, it does not effectively minimize transaction
costs, and thus transactions under the Rule are not predictable.
Since the Rule is unpredictable, this increases the fear of liability
among both Canadian securities attorneys and their corporate cli-
ents. The resulting fear of liability deters investment in U.S. mar-
kets and creates various possible scenarios each of which do very
little to protect U.S. investors. It is not the author's contention,
however, that the existing Canadian attorney regulations are suf-
ficient, but rather that an altered rule should be imposed upon
Canadian corporate attorneys, such that the protections to inves-
tors are not outweighed by the costs of imposition.
Part II of this comment will provide an economic framework
for analyzing whether institutions effectively minimize transac-
tions costs in an international context. Part III will employ the
framework to analyze the transaction costs resulting from the
appearing foreign attorney exception), available at http://www.sec.gov.rules.final.33-
8185 (last visited Sept. 26, 2004).
15. Id.
16. Comment from The Law Society of Upper Canada, to Jonathan G. Katz,
Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 6, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/vkrishna1.htm (Dec. 6, 2002).
17. See Atkins, supra note 10.
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U.S. imposition of Rule 205 upon Canada, and illustrate how Rule
205 is unpredictable. Part IV will explore the various scenarios
that can result due to the unpredictability of the Rule and will
show how in each of the scenarios U.S. investors receive little pro-
tection. Part V will establish a framework that enhances the pre-
dictability of the Rule and allocates authority so that both the
United States and Canada can maximize their achievements of
social policy.
PART II: UNDERSTANDING TRANSACTION COSTS FROM AN
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Minimizing Transaction Costs Through
Institutions
In the 1930s, Ronald Coase brought the importance of trans-
action costs to the forefront of understanding both social and eco-
nomic processes.' Academic research and empirical evidence has
confirmed his theorem [hereinafter "the Coase Theorem"]:
Where bargaining is relatively costless, an efficient alloca-
tion of the relevant property right (i.e., the one that maxi-
mizes the value of production) will be achieved regardless
of the initial allocation of that right. But the distribution of
this maximized value will differ from one initial allocation
to another. 9
In other words, the Coase Theorem contends that, absent transac-
tion costs, the initial distribution of property rights will not have
efficiency ramifications because people will engage in reallocative
transactions that yield efficient results.20 But, as Coase himself
stressed, the real world is one of uncertainty and incomplete
knowledge, creating transaction costs and it is necessary to gain a
better understanding of this world so that policy making can be
more efficient."' Of particular note in his work is the role of insti-
tutions, or combinations of formal and informal rules and sanc-
22tions, in reducing transactions costs by making human behavior
18. SVETOZAR PEJOVICH, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONS AND SYSTEMS 9 (rev.
2d ed. 1998).
19. Id. at 12.
20. Joel P. Trachtman, Reflections on the Nature of the State: Sovereignty, Power
and Responsibility, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 399, 409 (1994).
21. Pejovich, supra note 18, at 12.
22. Trachtman, supra note 20, at 402 n.9 ("Institutions are the humanly devised
constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction.").
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predictable. 3 Institutions can accomplish this by being both credi-
ble and stable.24
For rules to be credible, they must be well defined and strictly
and consistently enforced.2" If rules are loosely enforced, they do
not encourage predictable behavior.26 The result is ultimately
higher transaction costs and fewer transactions. For rules to be
stable they must not foster renegotiation; in other words, there is
an efficient allocation of authority. If potential parties to a trans-
action are not confident in the stability of their rights under a rule
because they are under the impression that the rules may change,
they are less likely to transact.28
There are two main components to attaining a stable alloca-
tion of authority.29 First, authority should be granted proportion-
ally according to whose constituents are most affected; shared
effects indicate a need for shared authority. ° This encompasses a
broad definition of "affected" that includes not only the effects
directly related to the rule established, but also externalities. 1
Second, authority should be granted to the government that holds
a comparative advantage in regulating the particular subject mat-
ter at issue.32 For instance, 'a governmental agency with more
experience with a certain regulatory problem, or one with a supe-
rior regulatory mechanism would ultimately have a comparative
advantage.
Additionally, imperfect information and bounded rationality
should be taken into account when analyzing the credibility and
stability of an institution. For example, the rule maker may not
have knowledge of the informal rules and norms that influence
the way people interact.3 Lack of such information reduces the
23. Id. at 405. See also Pejovich, supra note 18, at 24.
24. See Pejovich, supra note 18, at 24-26. See also Trachtman, supra note 20, at
410-12.
25. See Pejovich, supra note 18, at 24.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 25 (stating that a study presented convincing evidence that by denying
investors' confidence in the stability of private property rights, the New Deal
contributed significantly to prolonging the Great Depression).
29. See Trachtman, supra note 20, at 410-12.
30. Id. at 411.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 412.
33. See Richard W. Painter, A New Institutional Economics Perspective on the
Limits to U.S. Regulation of Non-U.S. Securities Lawyers 10 (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (Presented at Harvard University, Center for
European Studies (Mar. 11, 2004) & Wasdea University, Institute for Corporation
144
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rule maker's ability to consistently enforce the rules and yield
predicable results. Rule makers also suffer from bounded ration-
ality. 4 This occurs where multiple goals and interests exist and
the rule maker inadvertently advances one group's interests over
another's.
B. Allocating Jurisdiction Over International
Transactions by Assessing the Effectiveness of
Institutions in Minimizing Transaction Costs
The above discussion focuses on the role of institutions in
reducing transaction costs within a particular state, i.e., from a
vertical sovereignty perspective. But, what happens when one
state exerts horizontal sovereignty and imposes certain rules upon
a different state, which has its own set of institutions and rules?
It is necessary to determine whether this extraterritorial imposi-
tion is efficient in reducing transaction costs. One approach to
achieve efficiency is to employ an "effects test," allocating jurisdic-
tion in proportion to effects:
Prescriptive jurisdiction over a transaction should be allo-
cated to the government(s) whose constituents are affected
by the transaction, pro rata in proportion to the relative
magnitude of such effects, as accurately as is merited given
transaction costs in allocation of prescriptive jurisdiction."
This test is a measure to determine how much jurisdiction should
exist, rather than a strict test that determines whether jurisdic-
tion should exist at all. 6
To employ this "effects test" it is necessary to determine the
effects of an extraterritorial imposition in relation to transaction
costs. Furthermore, to maximize the effect of social policy of both
states involved in the transactions, it is necessary to determine
whether the legislation effectively minimizes transaction costs.
As stated previously, transaction costs can be assessed by looking
at whether the rule is credible and stable, and also by determining
to what extent rule makers suffer from imperfect information and
bounded rationality.
Law & Society, International, Symposium: "The Role of Lawyer in Corporate
Behavior: Past & Future" (Mar. 18, 2004)).
34. Id.
35. Trachtman, supra note 20, at 408.
36. Id.
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PART III: ASSESSING TRANSACTION COSTS RESULTING FROM
THE UNITED STATES IMPOSITION OF RULE 205 UPON
CANADIAN ATTORNEYS
If the application of a state's rule is unpredictable, then fears
of the unknown discourage people from transacting under the
rule. This concept is elucidated from the perspective of a Cana-
dian securities lawyer practicing in Alberta:
Lawyers practicing in the area of securities laws want cer-
tainty. They want to know and need to know whether they
have a duty to prospective investors and the public in gen-
eral. They need to know whether they must conduct an
independent due diligence of all facts relating to their cli-
ents' affairs before they take on an engagement no matter
how restricted. They need to know whether they must
ensure whether every document and every process fully
complies with securities laws. They need to know the time
and cost required to effect an engagement and the inherent
risk of being sued . . ..
The foregoing will employ the framework of the "effects test"
established in the previous section to illustrate how Rule 205 is
far from predictable, and thus does not reduce transaction costs
because it is neither credible nor stable.
A. Credibility
If a state's rules are not properly defined and are not enforced
strictly and consistently, they lack credibility." Rule 205 is not
credible because, as explained below, it contains ambiguous excep-
tions and standards. With these ambiguities, it is unlikely that
the SEC will enforce the Rule consistently. As a result, both
domestic and foreign attorneys, especially foreign attorneys, will
fear liability no matter what their actions. Such fear increases
costs to corporations and deters transactions.
For the purposes of the application of the Rule to foreign and
Canadian lawyers, the most notable lack of clarity is found in the
definition of "non-appearing foreign attorney."39 This important
definition provides a safe-harbor to foreign and Canadian lawyers
from the requirement to comply with the Rule.
37. Comment from Gregory J. Leia, to Jonathan Katz, Secretary, United States
Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 29, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/s74502/gjleial.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2004) (emphasis added).
38. See Pejovich, supra note 18, at 24.
39. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(j) (2002).
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In order for a Canadian attorney to qualify as a non-appear-
ing foreign attorney, he or she must meet three criteria. First, the
attorney must be admitted to practice law in a jurisdiction outside
the United States.40 Second, the attorney cannot hold him or her-
self out as practicing, or giving legal advice regarding U.S. federal
or state securities or other laws. 41 The third criterion is bifur-
cated. The first prong of the third criterion is met when an attor-
ney appears and practices before the Commission only
incidentally to, and in the ordinary course of, the practice of law in
a jurisdiction outside of the United States.4 Alternatively, the
second prong is met when the attorney appears and practices
before the Commission in consultation with an attorney licensed
to practice in the United States.43
The first criterion for the non-appearing foreign attorney safe-
harbor is very straightforward, but the clarity ends there.
Regarding the second criterion, Canadian attorneys will have dif-
ficulty determining whether they are "holding themselves out" as
practicing or advising in U.S. legal matters. This phrase can be a
derivation of the "shingle theory" that is well established in U.S.
securities law relating to underwriters, brokers, and dealers. The
concept, however, while recognizable in the United States, may
not be familiar to Canadian attorneys, and the Rule provides no
guidance to foreign issuers regarding this. Furthermore, the third
criterion leaves much to be questioned. First, Canadian attorneys
are given no compass to determine what is "incidental" U.S. secur-
ities legal advice.44 Moreover, the SEC does not clarify to what
extent a U.S. attorney needs to collaborate with a Canadian attor-
ney in order to be exempt from this Rule.
Not only are there ambiguities in the non-appearing foreign
attorney safe-harbor, but they also exist in another important
exemption opportunity for Canadian lawyers. Under the sanc-
tions and discipline section, the Rule states that attorneys practic-
ing outside of the United States do not have to comply with the
Rule if compliance is prohibited by applicable foreign law.45 In the
40. Id. at § 205.2(j)(1).
41. Id. at § 205.2(j)(2).
42. Id. at § 205.2(j)(3)(i).
43. Id. at § 205.2(j)(3)(ii).
44. Garfield Emerson, Q.C., Canadian Lawyers: Responding to the SEC's
Standards of Professional Conduct and Becoming a "Non-Appearing Foreign
Attorney," in SECURITIES AND MERGERS & AcQUISITIONS BULLETIN, March 2003, at 4,
available at http://www.fasken.com/\WEB/flmdwebsite.nsf/AllDoc/0219142OC7B897AC
85256CEE00551222/$File/SECMAMAR03.PDF (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
45. 17 C.F.R. § 205.6(d) (2002).
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context of Canada, it is unclear whether the codes of professional
conduct established by the law societies of the Canadian provinces
and territories would be considered "applicable foreign law" under
this exemption. The relevant conflicts between the Canadian Law
Societies' codes of professional conduct and Rule 205 will be dis-
cussed infra. If an "applicable law" conflicts only with certain por-
tions of the Rule, it is also unclear whether the foreign attorney
will be exempt from the entire Rule or just the portion that
conflicts.
If a Canadian attorney does somehow establish that he or she
is not exempt from Rule 205 amidst the ambiguous safe harbors,
he or she will still have difficulty knowing at what point it is nec-
essary to start reporting "up the ladder" within a company. The
Rule provides that "up-the-ladder" reporting duties are triggered
when there is credible evidence of a material violation by the
issuer (or any officer, director, employee, or agent of the issuer) of
applicable U.S. federal or state securities law, or material breach
of fiduciary duty, or a similar violation of law.46 The standard is
whether a prudent and competent attorney is reasonably likely to
become aware of the material violation. 47
As succinctly stated by a securities lawyer practicing in
Ontario:
Determining whether or not a state of fact is, for a "prudent
and competent attorney" "reasonably likely" to be a "mate-
rial violation" under United States federal or state law or a
material breach of fiduciary duty . . . arising under state
law is not an area in respect of which Canadian lawyers
may be considered to have the requisite professional
expertise.48
In other words, Canadian attorneys may not be in a position to
make the appropriate professional judgment in order to comply
with the Rule. 49 It is also relevant to note that Canadian attor-
neys that represent issuers in U.S. markets will be discouraged
from researching U.S. securities law so that they may possess the
necessary professional judgment to advise their clients ade-
quately; conducting such research would preclude them from qual-
ifying as a non-appearing foreign attorney."0 Additionally, the
46. Id. at § 205.3(b).
47. Id. at § 205.2(e).
48. Emerson, supra note 44, at 5.
49. Id.
50. Canadian attorneys will be considered to be advising on U.S. law if they
conduct research for foreign issuers regarding what would be a material violation of
148
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inability of a Canadian lawyer to make a professional judgment
about whether it is reasonably likely that credible evidence of a
material violation exists is unlikely to be a defense to a violation of
the Rule.51 This depends on how the SEC applies the standard of
a "prudent and competent attorney;" but even so, the likely failure
of foreign attorneys to achieve this standard, increases the risk of
liability under the Rule. Additionally, Rule 205 also fails to pro-
vide all attorneys with guidance as to what constitutes an "appro-
priate" corporate response after the attorney initially reports "up
the ladder" to the CEO or the CLO of the corporation. 52
In sum, the ambiguous "non-appearing foreign attorney" safe-
harbor, the conflict of law preemption exception, triggering stan-
dard, and the nature of the "appropriate" corporate response all
contribute to the lack of credibility and hence the unpredictability
of Rule 205. As discussed infra, that the SEC is given much dis-
cretion in the enforcement of the Rule also detracts from the credi-
bility of the Rule.5
B. Stability
Svetozar Pejovich, an Economics Professor at Texas A&M
University, compares the consequences of unstable institutions
with a football game.54 He states that frequent changes in the
rules of the game would raise the costs of the game downstream,
noting, "Football fans would not be able to enjoy the game, players
would not know how to prepare for it, and football clubs would
seek coaches who are better at getting rules changed than at
coaching the players."5 Similarly, if Rule 205 is unstable, inves-
tors in public corporations will not be able to benefit from becom-
ing better acquainted with the Rule and identifying the best
the U.S. securities laws and then advise their clients based on the research. See 17
C.F.R. §§ 205.2(iv)(a)(iii-(iv) (2002). If they provide advice regarding U.S. law, they
are considered to be appearing and practicing before the Commission and would be
subject to the Rule. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(j)(2) (2002).
51. Id.
52. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(3) (2003). See also Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is
There a Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1097, 1114
(2003) ("Will some level of corporate response short of accepting the attorney's
recommendations ever be sufficient? In cases involving the exercise of political
judgment or in which reasonable minds can disagree, what sort of corporate decision-
making record is sufficient to demonstrate that the attorney's information has been
delivered, considered and rationally rejected?").
53. See infra Part III.C.
54. See Pejovich, supra note 18, at 26.
55. Id.
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investment opportunities. Securities lawyers will not know how
to prepare to be effective gatekeepers or for potential liabilities.
Moreover, foreign issuers in U.S exchanges will seek out corporate
attorneys and firms who are better at encouraging a change in the
rules than at actually preventing corporate fraud.
The following discussion will illustrate how Rule 205 is not
completely stable. A rule is unstable and likely to change where it
fails to accord an appropriate amount of authority to a govern-
ment whose constituents are affected by the circumstance in ques-
tion, and where it allocates authority to a government other than
the government that holds a "comparative advantage" in regulat-
ing the subject matter." It is debatable whether Canada's or the
United States' constituents are most affected by the Rule and
whether Canada or the United States has a comparative advan-
tage in the regulation of securities attorneys. Since neither the
United States nor Canada can be said to be effected the most by
the Rule or to possess a distinct comparative advantage in regu-
lating attorneys, it would be inefficient for the United States to
monopolize attorney regulation in Canada. Similarly, it would be
inefficient for the United States to refrain from regulating
altogether.
1. Affected Constituents
It can be argued that Rule 205 affects very few Canadians
both because of the Rules' safe-harbors for attorneys and the cur-
rent trends in Canada, including the growth of trans-border law
firms and the private placement of Canadian subsidiaries of U.S.
companies. Because of the "non-appearing foreign attorney" safe-
harbor, Rule 205 primarily applies only to Canadian and non-U.S.
lawyers who advise on compliance with U.S. law without assis-
tance from U.S. co-counsel.57 Moreover, there has been a consoli-
56. See Trachtman, supra note 20, at 410-412.
57. See Painter, supra note 33, at 1. There are exceptions to Rule 205 that are
strictly for foreign attorneys and exceptions that are for all attorneys. For foreign and
Canadian attorneys, there is the non-appearing foreign attorney exception, and the
conflicts of law preemption exception. See infra Part III.A. Additionally, any attorney
would not be considered to be appearing and practicing before the Commission and
hence exempt from the rule, if he or she is appearing and practicing other than in the
context of providing legal services to an issuer with whom the attorney has an
attorney-client relationship. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.2(a)(2)(i), 205.3(1) (2003). Also, any
attorney that (1) is retained or directed by the issuers' CLO or Qualified Legal
Compliance Committee [hereinafter "QLCC"] to investigate evidence of a material
violation; or (2) is retained or directed by the issuers' CLO or QLCC to assert a
colorable defense on behalf of the issuer - or the issuer's officer, director, employee or
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dation and internationalization of large Canadian law firms
where many Canadian law firms have integrated or established
alliances with U.S. law firms, making it easier for Canadian issu-
ers to obtain assistance from U.S. co-counsel and be exempt from
Rule 205.8 Additionally, the fact that most Canadian subsidiar-
ies, which represent a major share of the Canadian financial mar-
ket, have been privatized indicates a reduction of Canadian
issuers in U.S. public markets and hence the number of Canadi-
ans affected by the Rule. 9
It can be argued that this minimal affect upon Canadians is
overshadowed by the Rule's affect upon Americans. The Rule is
meant to protect U.S. investors and restore investor confidence in
U.S. markets, both of which are necessary for the United States to
compete effectively in the context of international exchanges.6 0
Aside from maintaining a competitive advantage among new high
disclosure exchanges, it can also be argued that the United States
especially needs to impose stricter professional regulations upon
Canadian attorneys to protect U.S. investors. This is because the
market for legal services in Canada is highly competitive, giving
lawyers incentives not to report the misconduct of management. 1
Alternatively, it can be argued that the effect of the Rule upon
Canadians is greater than the effect of the Rule upon Americans.
First, although the Rule does provide safe-harbors for Canadian
attorneys, it remains to be seen how they will be enforced, espe-
agent - in any investigation or judicial or administrative proceeding relating to
evidence of a material violation, is not subject to the rule. See 17 C.F.R.
§§ 205.3(b)(6)(i)(A-B), 205.3(b)(6)(ii), 205.3(b)(7)(i-iii) (2003).
58. See E-mail from Harry W. Arthurs, Professor of Law at Osgoode Hall Law
School at York University, to Lauren Harper (April 13, 2004, 4:14 EST) [hereinafter
Arthurs e-mail] (on file with author); Harry W. Arthurs, The State We're in: Legal
Education in Canada's New Political Economy, 20 WINDSOR Y.B. OF ACCESS TO JUST.
35, 45-48 (2001) [hereinafter The State We're in]; Harry W. Arthurs, Lawyering in
Canada in the 21st Century, 15 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 202, 211, 216 (1996).
59. See Arthurs e-mail, supra note 58.
60. Since the 1990s, cross-listing by foreign issuers into U.S. exchanges has
accelerated because of the "bonding" opportunity it provides: by voluntarily
subjecting themselves to the higher disclosure standards and greater threat of
enforcement of the U.S., foreign issuers achieve a higher market valuation. See
generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings
and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 1757 (2002). Other countries, however, have created some competition by
creating "high disclosure" exchanges. Id. Hence, it is important for the United States
to ensure its bonding opportunities after the corporate scandals of Enron and those
that followed, through more stringent rules to maintain its competitive advantage.
Id.
61. See infra Part III.C.
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cially considering the many ambiguities in the safe harbors 62 and
the likelihood of inconsistent enforcement of the RuleY.6  The
SEC's discretion in enforcement may result in many more Cana-
dian attorneys being subject to the Rule.6' Second, due to the less
ambiguous "non-appearing foreign attorney" safe-harbor regard-
ing the retaining of U.S. counsel, Canadian corporations may
incur the extra costs of hiring U.S. counsel in addition to their
Canadian counsel.65
Third, the Rule also conflicts with Canadian laws, which may
result in Canadian attorneys being subject to liability or discipli-
nary action in Canada if they comply with the Rule. The most
notable conflict would be between Rule 205's proposed "noisy
withdrawal" and Canadian law societies' codes of professional con-
duct regarding confidentiality. As aforementioned, the "noisy
withdrawal" requires disclosure of a client's illegal conduct when
substantial financial harm is likely to result from an issuer's vio-
lation. Contrarily, the confidentiality provisions of the Canadian
law societies prohibit disclosure of a client's illegal conduct if the
only harm that will result is financial, however serious it may be.66
62. See supra Part III.A.
63. See infra Part III.C.
64. Id.
65. This deduction is based on the notion that as parties to a transaction become
better acquainted with the rules they learn how to adjust to the system and exploit
the most beneficial opportunities. The most beneficial opportunity under Rule 205 for
foreign attorneys would be to gain exemption from the most predictable safe harbor -
obtaining assistance from U.S. counsel. See Pejovich, supra note 18, at 25.
66. Out of 13 Canadian provinces and territories, 5 use the Canadian Bar
Association ("CBA") Code and the others use variations; however, in all of the codes a
lawyer may disclose illegal conduct by a client only where there is an imminent risk to
an identifiable person or group of persons of death or serious bodily or psychological
harm and then only if the lawyer first obtains a court order permitting such
disclosure. See CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Chapter IV (Ottawa: The Can. Bar Ass'n
1988), available at http://cba.org/CBA/activities/code/ [hereinafter "the CBA Code"]
(last visited Oct. 26, 2004). See also, e.g., CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.03 (The Law
Soc'y of Upper Can. 1987) (amended 2004), available at http://www.lsuc.on.ca/
services/RulesProfCondpage-en.jsp (last visited Oct. 26, 2004); CODE OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 7.8 (The Law Soc'y of Alta. 2001) (amended 2004), available at http://
www.lawsocietyalberta.com/files/code.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2004); CODE OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 4.11 (The Law Soc'y of Sask. 1991), available at http://www.lawsociety.
sk.ca/code.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2004). See also Interview by Doug Harris, Capital
Market Institute (CMI) Director, with Philip Anisman, author of the Policy Comment,
available at www.utcmi.ca (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
The "noisy withdrawal" provision, if adopted by the SEC, requires a lawyer to
withdraw from a representation, inform the SEC that the withdrawal was based on
"professional considerations" and promptly disaffirm to the SEC any opinion,
document or representation in a document in the preparation of which the lawyer
assisted that he reasonably believes "is or may be materially false or misleading."
2004] OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY 153
Conflicts also exist between Canadian legal principles and Rule
205 regarding security commissions' authority to regulate the
legal profession. Various cases in the provinces of Alberta and
Ontario stand for the proposition that the provincial securities
commissions do not have the inherent jurisdiction to issue a code
of conduct for lawyers and cannot issue remedial sanctions
against lawyers.6 7 These conflict arguments are, however, depen-
dent upon whether the SEC will deem Canadian provincial securi-
ties commission laws and law societies' rules of professional
conduct, to be "applicable foreign law" under the Rule's conflicts of
law preemption provision.68 If these laws are considered "applica-
ble foreign law," then they will preempt Rule 205 and reduce the
effect of the rule upon Canadian attorneys.
Fourth, the mandatory "up the ladder" reporting imposes a
more stringent standard upon most Canadian provinces' and ter-
ritories' codes of professional conduct. Only the Law Society of
Upper Canada, which regulates the attorneys of Ontario, requires
lawyers to report any evidence of corporate wrongdoing up the cor-
porate ladder.69 Fifth, a Canadian lawyer who violates any provi-
sion of the Rule is subject to the disciplinary authority of the SEC,
regardless of whether the lawyer may also be subject to sanctions
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg.
71,670 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(i)(A-C) (2003))
(setting forth the proposed steps of the "noisy withdrawal"). The SEC's new
alternative proposal, however, commonly referred to as the "silent withdrawal,"
would not conflict with Canadian professional rules because it permits, but not does
not require, a lawyer to notify the SEC. It would only require the attorney to report to
the CEO and would then obligate the issuer to publicly disclose to the SEC a
withdrawal and the circumstances relating to it. A lawyer would be obligated to take
the steps outlined in either of these withdrawal requirements (if either one is
adopted) when he or she has reported up-the-ladder to the highest authority within
the company, and does not receive an appropriate response and reasonably believes
that a material violation is ongoing or is likely to result in substantial harm to the
financial interest or property of the issuer or investors.
67. See Henderson v. Alta. Secs. Comm'n, [2002] A.B.C.A. 264; Ainsley Fin. Corp.
v. Ont. Secs. Comm'n, [1994] 121 D.L.R. (4th) 79. For a discussion of these cases see
Comment from Gregory J. Leisa, Barrister and Solicitor, to Jonathan Katz, Secretary,
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed
s74502/gjleial.htm. See also Philip Anisman, Regulation of Lawyers by Securities
Commissions: Sarbanes-Oxley in Canada (2003) (unpublished policy paper for the
University of Toronto Capital Markets Institute), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/proposed/s74502/panismanl.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2004) (stating that the
Ontario Securities Commission lacks the authority to prohibit a lawyer from
appearing before it in any capacity).
68. 17 C.F.R. § 205.6(d) (2002). See also supra Part III.A.
69. See RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.02 (The Law Soc'y of Upper Can. 1987)
(amended 2004). The other provinces will only permit such reporting, but may not
say so expressly in the rules.
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for the same conduct in a jurisdiction where the lawyer is admit-
ted to practice. 0 In short, Canadian lawyers may be subject to
liability in both jurisdictions.
Finally, in response to continuing pressures from regulatory
groups, such as the Ontario Securities Commission and the SEC,
the Law Society of Upper Canada has recently harmonized its pro-
fessional codes of conduct with the mandatory "up the ladder"
reporting of Rule 205.71 Gavin McKenzie, a member of the work-
ing group that drew up the new rules, stated: "What we have
done is changed it from guidance in the commentary [which
accompanies and explains the regulations] to being mandatory.
As a result, Ontario now has the highest standards of corporate
governance for lawyers in all of Canada."7 2 The new rules, how-
ever, do not change the confidentiality standard of the Law Soci-
ety of Upper Canada.7 3
This is evidence that despite the conflict in the "up the ladder"
reporting, at least one Canadian province was willing to incur the
extra costs of harmonizing its rules, at least partially, to facilitate
transactions with the United States. As of yet, no other Canadian
province or territory has adopted similar rules.74 If other prov-
inces harmonize their laws,75 then Canadians could be negatively
70. See Emerson, supra note 44.
71. See Terrence Belford, New Rules Spur Legal Whistle Blowers: But Lawyers are
Divided on The Effects of Laws Forcing Them to Report, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Mar.
22, 2004), available at http://theglobeandmail.com (last visited (Oct. 26, 2004).
72. See Terrence Belford, New Whistle Blower Rule Approved, THE GLOBE AND
MAIL (Mar. 29, 2004), available at http://theglobeandmail.com (last visited Oct. 26,
2004). See also RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.02 (The Law Soc'y of Upper Can. 1987)
(amended 2004).
73. According to the Professional Regulation Committee of the Law Society of
Upper Canada that drafted the new "up the ladder" rules: "[Tihe confidentiality
standard is central to the integrity of the "up-the-ladder" reporting regime. If the
openness and candour of the lawyer and client relationship is compromised, the
lawyer is much less likely to become aware of improper conduct and to be in a position
to counsel the client against it or take appropriate steps to address it." See The Law
Society of Upper Canada Report to Convocation by the Professional Regulation
Committee 13 (Mar. 25, 2004), available at http://www.lsuc.on.ca/news/pdf/
convmar04_prc-report.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
74. The executive director of the Federation of Law Societies of Canada in
Montreal is not aware of any other jurisdiction in Canada that is taking similar
actions to the Law Society of Upper Canada in harmonizing its rules with Rule 205.
See Belford, supra note 72.
75. Even though Canadian law societies have no present intentions to harmonize
their laws with that of Rule 205, it is probable that they will eventually. Canada is
very much export dependent with the United States being its dominant trading
partner. See Harry W. Arthurs, Globalization of the Mind: Canadian Elites and the
Restructuring of Legal Fields 12 CAN. J. L. Soc'v. 219, 223-24 (1997) [hereinafter
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impacted. Since the harmonized laws reflect the interests of the
principle players of the global economy, in this case the United
States, they often ignore the interests of Canadian local communi-
ties, consumers, businesses, and workers."6 Harmonizing can also
contravene Canadian national law or policy.77
In conclusion, it can be deduced that if Rule 205's conflict of
law preemption applies to the Codes of Professional Conduct of
the Canadian law societies or if the other law societies of Canada
will harmonize their laws with that of Rule 205, then less Cana-
dian constituents would be directly affected by the Rule. This
notion is bolstered by the many exceptions the Rule provides for
foreign attorneys. In this case, the effects of the Rule upon
Canadians are minimal. Moreover, these effects are outweighed
by the effects of the Rule upon the United States, a country that
needs to protect its investors from Canadian corporate misconduct
and maintain its competitive position among international high-
disclosure foreign exchanges. However, an argument could be
made that harmonization could negatively impact Canadians.
Alternatively, if Rule 205's conflict of law preemption does not
apply to the Canadian law societies' codes of professional conduct
and there is no harmonization, then it can be deduced that many
more Canadian constituents would be affected. This view is bol-
stered by the ambiguous exceptions for foreign attorneys, which,
depending on the SEC's interpretation and enforcement of the
Globalization of the Mind]. Canada usually aligns its laws with the U.S. so it is easier
to do business. See The State We're In, supra note 58, at 40-41. This is exemplified by
Canada's harmonization with other Sarbanes-Oxley provisions regarding corporate
governance. See PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Companies Energized by Need to Change
Practices, available at http://www.pwc.com/extweb/manissue.nsf/docid/FEFBOCCF4
F1960F085256E8C0068AAFD (last visited Oct. 26, 2004). For a summary of the new
investor protection rules see Canadian Securities Administrators News Release, New
Rules Promote Investor Confidence, Change Issuers' Disclosure and Governance
Practices (Mar. 29, 2004), available at http://www.csa-acvm.ca/htmlCSA/news/04_05
new disclosure.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2004). For a discussion regarding the
debates Canadian security commissions' encounter when deciding whether to
harmonize see David Brown, Chair of the Ontario Securities Commission, Address to
the Investment Funds Institute of Canada (Sept. 19, 2002) ("If we are going to attract
Canadian and international investors, they need to have confidence in the safety of
our markets. If we are going to attract issuers, we need a regulatory system that is
not too burdensome or costly; we need a system that allows our markets to be
competitive."), available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/Speeches/sp-20020919-
ific-annual-conf.jsp (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
76. See The State We're In, supra note 58, at 40-42.
77. Id. (stating that Canada is willing to acquiesce to forces of global legal order by
harmonizing and actively enforcing the harmonized laws, despite the fact that the
global regime may contravene or undermine Canadian national law or policy).
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exceptions, may increase the number of attorneys covered by the
Rule. The effects upon Canadians in this situation may very well
outweigh the affects upon Americans.
It is clear that both Canadians and Americans are affected by
the Rule, but there are still many unknowns. However, there will
be more certainty regarding the Rule's true direct effects when it
is clear which Canadian attorneys are subject to the Rule. Such a
determination can only be made after the SEC clarifies its ambig-
uous exceptions for foreign attorneys through enforcement
proceedings.
2. Comparative Advantage
If a state is more experienced or is more successful in regulat-
ing a certain area, then it has a comparative advantage in regula-
tion. Furthermore, if a country with such a comparative
advantage creates and imposes certain laws upon another country
that relate to its comparative advantage, then it is less likely that
the rules will be unstable and susceptible to change. The compar-
ative advantages of U.S. law versus the comparative advantages
of Canadian law in regulating securities lawyers will be explored
in this discussion.
It can be argued that both the United States and Canada
have different comparative advantages in regulating securities
lawyers. The United States can be said to have the comparative
advantage because both its laws and social, cultural, and ideologi-
cal norms regarding lawyer regulation have been emulated by
Canada.v" One such explanation is that Canadian influences of
legal and professional culture tend to give way before the forces of
political economy.79 This explanation, however, does not necessa-
rily indicate that U.S. regulation is superior. That there is a
dearth of literature, discourse, and education regarding legal eth-
ics in Canada, when compared to the United States, may indicate
that the United States is better equipped to regulate in this area. 0
78. See Globalization of the Mind, supra note 75, at 222.
79. Canada is unusually export-dependent. The United States is its largest
market. Therefore, Canada's prosperity largely depends upon its capacity to
stimulate American investment in Canada and demand for Canadian goods and
services in the United States. Id. at 223-24; Arthurs e-mail, supra note 58.
80. See generally Adam M. Dodek, Canadian Legal Ethics: A Subject in Search of
Scholarship, 50 U. TORONTO L. J. 115 (2000). See also Alice Woolley, Integrity in
Zealousness: Comparing the Standard Conceptions of the Canadian and American
Lawyer, 9 CAN. J. L. AND JuRIs. 61 (1996) ("In contrast with . . . American
proliferation of critical perspectives of legal ethics, little Canadian scholarship on the
subject of lawyers' ethics exists.").
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The argument for the United States' comparative advantage
is furthered by empirical evidence suggesting that very few Onta-
rio lawyers rely on the professional codes for the purposes of
resolving ethical issues, and that the ethical deliberations of those
who do rely on the codes are inhibited.81 In addition to the ques-
tionable effectiveness of the Canadian law societies' codes of pro-
fessional conduct in maintaining standards of conduct for
Canadian attorneys, it is also questionable whether the Canadian
law societies, at least in Saskatchewan, can be effective in enforc-
ing attorney misconduct that also qualifies as criminal conduct. 2
On the other hand, it is important to note that it is the United
States and not Canada that has experienced the corporate scan-
dals epitomized by Enron, where lawyers remained silent in the
face of blatant misconduct by corporate officers." U.S. legal ethics
scholars, such as Deborah Rhode, claim that the self-regulation of
the legal profession through the state bars is to blame: "The prob-
lem is not that bar policies are self-serving ... [riather the diffi-
culty is one of tunnel vision, compounded by inadequate
accountability."84 Through its authority under Rule 102(e), how-
81. See generally Margaret Ann Wilkinson, Christa Walker & Peter Mercer, Do
Codes of Ethics Actually Shape Legal Practice?, 45 McGILL L. J. 645 (2000)
(discussing the results of a research initiative undertaken by legal scholars at the
University of Western Ontario, that examines the effectiveness of codes of ethics in
maintaining standards of behaviors within the legal profession in Ontario).
82. See Graeme G. Mitchell, Disciplining Lawyers for Serious Professional
Misconduct-Is it Possible after Stromberg v. Law Society (Saskatchewan)?, 36
ADMIN. L.R. (2d) 213, 214 (1996) (contending that Stromberg precludes the law
society's discipline committee from assessing professional misconduct which also
qualifies as criminal conduct, until the criminal justice system has run its course).
But see Caroline Murdoch & Joan Brockman, Who's On First? Disciplinary
Proceedings by Self-Regulating Professions and Other Agencies for "Criminal"
Behaviour, 64 SASK. L. REV. 29, 39-40 (2001) (stating that Graeme G. Mitchell "has
taken Stromberg to its widest possible interpretation").
83. However, it has been suggested that Canada is equally as vulnerable to Enron-
like securities scandals. For example, Canadian boards of directors are "vulnerable to
the incentives for shirking and self-dealing" that were characteristic of Enron's board
of directors and that played a critical role in the company's failure. See Sarra, supra
note 1, at 718.
84. DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 143-45 (2000). In all Canadian provinces and territories the bar is self-
governing as well, but unlike the United States bar it is under a statutory mandate.
See Federation of Law Societies of Canada, The Practice of Law in Canada, at http:ll
www.fisc.calawsocieties/lawsocieties.asp. The Canadian Bar conducts its own
discipline procedures, including disbarment, subject to a limited right of appeal to the
courts for legal error, which differs somewhat from province to province. Id. The
provincial law societies can and do enact and enforce disciplinary codes. Id. The fact
that Canadian lawyers also enjoy such self-regulation may give rise to the same
problems that Rhode expressed. However, the author found no evidence supporting
157
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1
ever, the SEC has done little to correct the deficiencies of the state
bars and the inconsistent enforcement that is characteristic of the
SEC's regulation of securities attorneys.85 This may not change
with its newfound power and discretion under Rule 205. Addition-
ally, the SEC, like the U.S. state bar associations, is self-regulated
and is plagued by "tunnel vision," or bounded rationality. 8
In addition to the above United States regulatory deficiencies,
the Canadian comparative advantage can be evidenced by the
emphasis on integrity within the Canadian codes of professional
conduct.87 Alice Woolley states that the commitment to personal
integrity is a unique tradition of Canadian lawyer ethics and is
something that American lawyer ethics lack.8 Woolley also con-
tends that unlike the American Bar Association's Model Rules, the
exhortatory tone of the Canadian Bar Association's Code looks
beyond the principle of partisanship and encourages Canadian
lawyers to act in the interest of the community or of people other
than the client.89 Such contentions, however, do nothing to show
the relationship between the superior quality of the rules, and the
rules in practice. Hence, these rules do not prove the effective-
ness of Canadian regulation of attorneys.
In conclusion, the United States and Canada have different
comparative advantages in the regulation of securities lawyers.
Despite the fact that there is a dearth of literature on legal ethics
in Canada, there is evidence that U.S. regulation of securities law-
yers is less effective than that of their Canadian counterparts.
But, just because Enron-like corruption has not yet surfaced in
Canada, there is no indication that it does not exist. Thus, it is
not necessarily an indication that Canadian regulation is any
more effective.
this contention in her research. But see infra Part III.C (discussing bounded
rationality).
85. See infra Part III.C.
86. See infra Part III.C.
87. See Woolley, supra note 80, at 73-77. The CBA Code states that the principle
of integrity "underlies the entire code" of professional responsibility. Id. at 73.
Integrity is defined in the CBA Code as "soundness of moral principles... especially
in relation to truth and fair dealing, uprightness, honesty, sincerity." Id.
88. The contentions that the ABA Model Rules do not adhere to principles of
integrity or do not extend past the pure partisanship model of lawyer representation,
can be rebutted. Woolley even states "the underlying principle of integrity may be
less strong than [she has] suggested." Id. However, such a discussion is beyond the
scope of this comment.
89. Id.
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C. Other Predictability Problems
Lack of credibility and stability of rules are exacerbated by
other problems that contribute to a rule's unpredictability.90 Rich-
ard Painter claims that there are three such problems that have
particular significance for the regulation of securities lawyers and
are thus relevant to Rule 205. 91
First, rule makers have imperfect information, particularly
when they deal with complex subjects such as lawyer-client infor-
mational asymmetries, agency problems, and psychological forces
that affect how securities lawyers do their jobs. For example, the
SEC does not know, or at least does not effectively evaluate in its
rule-making and may not effectively evaluate in enforcement, how
the market for legal services affects the relationship between cor-
porations and their lawyers.92 Therefore, it is probable that the
United States does not know how equivalent market forces oper-
ate in Canada.9" Additionally, the SEC fails to understand the
90. See Painter, supra note 33, at 10; Pejovich, supra note 18, at 15.
91. See Painter, supra note 33, at 11-12.
92. The literature regarding organizational behavior and its connection to
corporate lawyering is underutilized, especially in the areas of disclosure and
corporate compliance. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-
Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. REV.
629 (1997). It has been opined that Rule 205 will be unlikely to result in better
information flows within the corporate hierarchies because it fails to take into
account the inherent incentive for lawyers, to overlook management wrongdoing. See
Stephen M. Bainbridge and Christina J. Johnson, Managerialism, Legal Ethics, and
Sarbanes-Oxley §307, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 299, 306-10. This "inherent incentive"
for managerial bias is due to the nature of the market for corporate legal services in
the United States. Id. See also, Fisch & Rosen, supra note 52, at 1114. Although the
corporate entity may be the lawyer's ultimate client, corporate managers hire lawyers
and hence lawyers must please corporate management. This is compounded because
of the importance of retaining and attracting clients to a lawyer's career, specifically,
the interrelationship between the partnership track at law firms and the ability of
attorneys to bring and keep business to the firm. Id. This is especially true given the
fact that most large corporations utilize the services of several outside law firms, and
that management, not the board of directors, allocates such service. Id.
Furthermore, the market for legal services leads lawyers to adopt the behavioral
biases of their managerial clients and limits the lawyer's ability to interpret
management behavior as wrongful. Id. See also Langevoort, supra note 93, at 636-
646.
93. The aforementioned problems, inhibiting the ability for U.S. lawyers to be
effective gatekeepers through Rule 205, are also present in Canada. First, the
structure of Canadian corporations is similar to that of U.S. corporations. See Sarra,
supra note 1, at 727 (stating that the corporate regime of Canada mirrors much of the
U.S. paradigm which includes having auditors and similar professionals as
gatekeepers or protectors of the disclosure process). Additionally, there are certain
trends that are "Americanizing" the legal profession in Canada, namely more
aggressive competitive practices. See Globalization of the Mind, supra note 75, at
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Canadian distinction between the barrister and the solicitor and
how such a dichotomy affects rule making and enforcement of the
professional rules in Canada. 4
Painter's second problem that contributes to unpredictability
is that optimal rules can change, and it may be necessary for
securities laws to adapt quickly to new information to be efficient
in the global economy. This is evidenced in the dramatic shift in
U.S. policies after the scandals of Enron and its successors.
Throughout the 1980s, the hybrid ideology of globalization and
neo-liberalism dominated United States governance and trans-
formed the political economy and legal systems of many coun-
tries.9 5 Commonly referred to as the "Washington Consensus,"
neo-liberalism globalization is predicated on the principle that
capital, expertise, and information must be allowed to flow across
national borders, free from state regulation." Under this theory,
state activism is regarded as a dangerous force causing adverse
reactions from the market, disinvestments, devaluation of the cur-
rency, and the introduction of distortion into public policy. 7 After
the avalanche of corporate scandals, however, commencing with
the collapse of Enron in 2002, it was evident that the neo-liberal
globalization ideology had to be modified; the world lost confidence
in the integrity of the securities markets that fuel American
capitalism.
Before Enron, the United States remained competitive in
international exchanges because it maintained a low-disclosure
exchange characterized by minimal governmental regulation of
foreign issuers. Currently, however, the United States maintains
237. However, the problems associated with the market for legal services in the
United States may be exacerbated in Canada. Canadian corporate and securities
attorneys are facing more competition than their American counterparts in the
market for legal services. See Arthurs e-mail, supra note 58. This is because of what
Harry Arthurs calls the "hollowing out of corporate Canada": most Canadian
subsidiaries of U.S. corporations and firms (which represent a major share of
Canada's financial markets) have either been taken private and many large Canadian
corporations have been bought out by U.S. and other foreign interests. Id. See also
Arthurs, Lawyering in Canada in the 21st Century, supra note 57, at 226-233. Less
Canadian corporations translates into less jobs for Canadian corporate lawyers,
which gives Canadian corporate lawyers even greater incentives to appease
management in order to secure their employment.
94. See Harris, supra note 66.
95. See The State We're In, supra note 58, at 36.
96. Id. at 36-37.
97. Id.
98. See Sarra, supra note 1, at 716; Atkins, supra note 10, available at http:l!
www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch02O503psa.htm.
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its competitive advantage by creating a high-disclosure exchange
through governmental regulation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
The pendulum may swing yet again and Rule 205, even if it were
the optimal rule, would not be most favorable in such
circumstances.
Third, Painter suggests that certain interest groups may
exert excessive influence upon the SEC in their regulation of
securities lawyers, making it even less likely that existing rules
are optimal rules.99 The SEC's interest group influences are evi-
denced by the long-standing tension between the members of the
U.S. bar and the SEC regarding the scope of the SEC's authority
to regulate lawyers, and the SEC's vacillation in the standards
used to regulate the profession.'00 Prior to Section 307 of
Sarbanes-Oxley and Rule 205, the SEC's authority to commence
disciplinary proceedings against those practicing before the Com-
mission was vested in Rule 102(e). 1l Under Rule 102(e) the SEC:
[M]ay censure a person or deny, temporarily or perma-
nently, the privilege of appearing and practicing before it in
any way to any person who is found by the [SEC] ... to be
lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in
unethical or improper professional conduct; or to have will-
fully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of
any provision of the [securities laws] .O2
In re Carter & Johnson [hereinafter Carter/Johnson], 3 a notable
Rule 102(e) proceeding in 1981, addressed the application of the
"unethical or improper professional conduct" provision to attor-
neys. The SEC reversed an administrative judge's finding that
two securities lawyers had engaged in unethical and improper
professional conduct because the SEC had never before defined
such a standard.' But, the SEC clarified that its interpretation
of "unethical and improper professional conduct" in Carter/John-
son was, in effect, notice as to how Rule 102(e) would be applied
prospectively:
When a lawyer with significant responsibilities in the effec-
99. See Painter, supra note 33, at 11-12.
100. See Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, SEC Adopts Professional Conduct
Standards for Attorneys, 229 NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, April 24, 2003; Theodore
Sonde & F. Ryan Keith, "Up the Ladder" and Over: Regulating Securities Lawyers-
Past, Present & Future, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 331 (2003).
101. Id.
102. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2002).
103. In re Carter & Johnson, 47 S.E.C. 471 (1981).
104. Id. at 511-12.
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tuation of a company's compliance with the disclosure
requirements of the federal securities laws becomes aware
that his client is engaged in a substantial and continuing
failure to satisfy those disclosure requirements, his contin-
ued participation violates professional standards unless he
takes prompt steps to end the client's noncompliance." 5
The SEC elaborated that "prompt steps" can include "where
appropriate, notification to the board of directors of a corporate
client."106
The SEC subsequently sought comments on a proposed rule
that would formalize the Carter/Johnson opinion, to which the
American Bar Association submitted a lengthy comment vocifer-
ously criticizing the SEC's position. 10 7 As a result, not only did the
SEC never finalize the rule, but in 1982, Edward Greene, the
then-General Counsel, also retreated from the Carter/Johnson
standard. Greene announced his intent to "generally limit" SEC
proceedings against attorneys "to those instances that pose the
most direct threat of harm."0 8 Greene made it SEC policy not to
initiate 102(e) proceedings against attorneys for improper profes-
sional conduct unless a court determined the attorney violated the
federal securities laws.10'9 Otherwise, the SEC should apply
existing state law standards for administrative proceedings based
upon alleged violations of ethical or professional standards."0
Since Carter/Johnson in 1981, there have been few cases
brought against lawyers under Rule 102(e).11' Rule 205 in 2003,
however, is a return to the standards established for attorney con-
duct in Carter/Johnson. According to Senator John Edwards, the
sponsor of Section 307, the Section "basically instructs the SEC to
start doing what they were doing 20 years ago, to start enforcing
this up-the-ladder principle." 2 There is no guarantee, however,
that the SEC will enforce Rule 205 more consistently or strictly
than it has in the past.
Painter's three additional problems illustrating other factors
105. Id. at 511.
106. Id. at 509-11.
107. See American Bar Association, Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of
Governor's 9-10 (Nov. 20-21, 1981).
108. Id.
109. Caroline M. Gentile & Jill E. Fisch, The Qualified Legal Compliance
Committee: Using the Attorney Conduct Rules to Restructure the Board of Directors,
53 DuKE L. J. 517, 525-26 (2003).
110. Block & Hoff, supra note 101, at n.7.
111. Id. at n.8.
112. Id. at n.9.
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that detract from Rule 205's predictability are compounded by the
fact that the SEC is given complete discretion in enforcement of
the Rule. Although Sarbanes-Oxley makes no distinctions
between United States and foreign issuers,113 the Act does provide
the SEC with the discretion to determine where and how to apply
the Act's provisions to foreign companies and, through Section 307
and Rule 205, their attorneys as well.114 SEC Commissioner, Paul
Atkins, stated in a 2003 speech: "[Als we move forward to imple-
ment Sarbanes-Oxley, we have tried and we will continue to try to
balance our responsibility to comply with the Act's mandate with
the need to make reasonable accommodations to our non-U.S.
issuers."1 5
In sum, the discretion granted to the SEC under the Act, com-
bined with problems of incomplete information, the necessity for
institutions to change in order to be optimal, and interest group
political influences will result in inconsistent enforcement and
detract from the predictability of Rule 205.
PART IV: UNPREDICTABILITY OF RULE 205 LEADS TO
SCARCE INVESTOR PROTECTION
As discussed above, Rule 205 suffers from lack of stability and
credibility, and the possibility of bounded rationality and incom-
plete knowledge. These problems make it difficult for U.S. securi-
ties lawyers and even more difficult for Canadian securities
lawyers, to predict how the Rule will be enforced. The unpredict-
able nature of the Rule raises the fear of liability to abnormal
levels. The following hypothesizes four scenarios that may result
from the exacerbated sense of liability that the Rule yields and
illustrates how investors receive little protection under each
scenario.
The first scenario may be that Canadian attorneys do not
transact at all, i.e., they do not represent Canadian companies
who issue in the U.S. securities markets. In this situation, U.S.
attorneys would most likely take on the job because they are bet-
ter positioned to represent clients with disclosures made to U.S.
investors. Canadian managers and directors, however, may be
less inclined to divulge information that may reveal corporate mis-
conduct to a U.S. attorney who has little knowledge of Canadian
113. See Atkins, supra note 9.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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customs and laws and who does not have a long-term relationship
with the Canadian companies. This inhibition of the flow of infor-
mation does not allow the U.S. attorney to be an effective gate-
keeper or protector to investors.
A situation where Canadian lawyers are the only counsel to
Canadian companies who issue in U.S. markets also poses
problems. Corporate managers and directors may fear that with
such an increased sense of liability, Canadian lawyers may over-
report. In turn, like with U.S. counsel, they will not divulge impor-
tant corporate confidences that would allow the lawyer to prevent
or mitigate harm to investors.
It is also possible that Canadian issuers in U.S. markets will
be represented by both Canadian and U.S. counsel. This possibil-
ity of dual representation is due to the fairly clear-safe harbor for
Canadian attorneys representing companies issuing in U.S. mar-
kets,116 so long as they are assisted by U.S. counsel. Although the
U.S. lawyer may be sanctioned under the Rule, this safe-harbor
allows for misconduct on the part of foreign attorneys working
with the U.S. lawyers. Furthermore, considering the above two
scenarios, it can be deduced that investors will still be denied ade-
quate protection under the Rule even if Canadian and U.S. law-
yers work in tandem given the ineffective communication between
corporate managers and directors and their counsel.
Alternatively, it is possible that Canadian issuers in U.S.
markets will seek assistance from "legal experts" who organize in
consulting firms, do not "hold themselves out" to be attorneys, and
hence are not liable under the Rule. In this scenario, there is no
protection to investors under Rule 205.17
Although the above scenarios are speculative to a certain
degree, they show that the benefits to investors are minimal and
do not outweigh the costs of imposing the Rule as it stands.
116. See supra Part III.A.
117. See Comment from Robert Eli Rosen, University of Miami Law Professor, to
Jonathan Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 17, 2002)
(stating that Rule 205 will increase the demand for non-practicing securities law
consultants), available at http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/rerosenl.htm (last
visited Oct. 26, 2004). Multidisciplinary partnerships such as the Big Four
accounting firms that offer legal consulting services may be another way for Canadian
companies to avoid attorney liability under the Rule. But see Geanne Rosenberg, Big
Four Auditors' Legal Services Hit By Sarbanes-Oxley, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL (Jan.
5, 2004), available at http://www.nylawyer.com/news/04/01/010504b.html (last visited
Oct. 26, 2004) (stating that there are new laws that strengthen auditor independence
and that three out of the four Big accounting firms have already discontinued their
legal services departmentsJ).
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PART V: CREATING AN OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY
Parts III and IV discussed the transaction costs of Rule 205,
the increased fear of liability that the transaction costs created,
and the negative effects of the increased fear upon investor protec-
tion. This section establishes a framework to create an altered
Rule 205 that reduces transaction costs and better protects inves-
tors by allocating jurisdiction horizontally across state lines and
vertically within state lines.
According to Painter and his New Institutional Economic
analysis, jurisdictional competition is preferable to extraterrito-
rial imposition of legislation such as Rule 205.11 He claims that, if
countries experiment with different rules for securities lawyers
and observe different outcomes, then each jurisdiction can change
its rules after observing the results of the experimentation. Ulti-
mately, Painter contends that such competition will lead to better
rules." 9
While Painter's argument has merit due to unpredictable
transaction costs, a completely unmitigated competition model is
not ideal in maximizing social preferences. First, competition
occurs vertically within states and sub-national units.1 0 Second,
different groups within states have different preferences.'21 Third,
the best states recognize that they cannot provide the most effi-
cient structures without transferring sovereignty to sub-national
units.'22 Hence, selective cooperation among states is necessary to
provide the most efficient regulation.'23
In light of the foregoing, this comment proposes a framework
whereby there is a combination of selective cooperation and juris-
dictional competition. First, similar to the effects test mentioned
earlier,'24 the regulation of securities lawyers should be allocated
proportionally to states, and specific sub-units within states, in
which a greater number of constituents are affected and there is a
comparative advantage in rule making. This would better ensure
the stability of the law and foster predictability. In Rule 205, for
118. See Painter, supra note 33, at 2.
119. Id.
120. See Trachtman, supra note 20, at 414-15.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. "Prescriptive jurisdiction over a transaction should be allocated to the
government(s) whose constituents are affected by the transaction, pro rata in
proportion to the relative magnitude of such effects, as accurately as is merited given
transaction costs in allocation of prescriptive jurisdiction." Id. at 408.
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instance, minimum standards can be imposed by the United
States upon other countries, such as Canada, with regards to "up
the ladder" reporting. Most countries' laws do not conflict with
this, and no confidentiality principles are breached. Rule 2 05's
"up the ladder" reporting provisions still should be revised to clar-
ify exceptions and ambiguities in the jurisdiction, and to ensure
credibility in the triggering standard.
However, it is also important to recognize that imperfect
information, bounded rationality, and interest group political
influences cannot be avoided. Therefore, it is impossible to elimi-
nate unpredictability merely by ensuring credibility and accuracy.
There are certain aspects of securities lawyer regulation where
jurisdictional competition is necessary for optimal rule making
because optimal solutions are uncertain and are likely to differ
across international boundaries.125 For instance, the United
States should not impose a noisy withdrawal because it unduly
burdens Canada and other foreign countries. These countries
encounter conflicts of informal and formal institutional problems
some of which cannot be predicted by the United States. Such reg-
ulation should be left to the law societies of Canada or to whatever
mechanism a country uses to regulate lawyers. 126
Experimentation with different rules will lead to better solu-
tions in some situations, but it is important to recognize the
effects of transaction costs. To the extent that rules can minimize
transaction costs by making them credible and stable, such mea-
sures should be taken and authority should be allocated
accordingly.
125. See Painter, supra note 33, at 2.
126. Philip Anisman states that security commissions in Canada should only
control the integrity of their processes and should not legislate beyond this. See
Anisman, supra note 67.
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